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Valdes In Washington many supporters of the Reagan Administration's Central America policy
are wondering whether the contras are really capable of overthrowing the Sandinista government.
As a result, several essays and monographs are being circulated on Capitol Hill in an attempt to
persuade lawmakers that the contras still have a chance for victory in Nicaragua. For instance, in an
article titled, "How to Win in Nicaragua" [PROCESSO (Mexico), 11/08/86:38] Democrat consultant
Bernard Aronson states he does not believe an internal insurrection is viable, nor a protracted
guerrilla war from Honduras. Instead, he calls for the takeover of Bluefields by the contras, the
establishment of a provisional government and the use of US naval forces to supply the provisional
government. Another notable example is an essay by Penn Kemble and Arturo J. Cruz, Jr., "How
the Nicaraguan Resistance Can Win" (COMMENTARY, 12/86:19-29). They also believe that while
in theory there are three options insurrection, intervention and "the long march" only the latter has
any prospects for success. Kemble and Cruz maintain that "neither US military intervention nor
a quick and overwhelming popular insurrection against the Sandinistas is likely." The only hope
then is more of same, i.e., the long march (a la Mao). For these authors, the long march "foresees
a long-term and perhaps militarily indecisive guerrilla struggle within Nicaragua, linked to a
much more intense political and diplomatic campaign in the world beyond. The hope of success
lies in wearing down and disrupting the Sandinistas' control over the population, while building
up support for the insurgency and opposition to the Sandinistas in the democratic world." Thus,
Kemble and Cruz appear to believe the Sandinistas will remain in power for quite some time.
Nowhere do we find, however, any serious analysis of the reasons for the contras' failure to date.
In early November this year a group of senior U.S. officials travelled throughout Central America
to meet with American ambassadors, Central American military commanders and intelligence
analysts. Everywhere they asked the same question: "Why is it that the Salvadoran guerrilas don't
need $100 million to keep on fighting, but the contras do?" (See NEW YORK TIMES, 12/15/86:6)
This is a very good question, indeed. Perhaps one day policymakers in Washington may stumble
upon the answer. It is doubtful, however, they will identify the answer as long as they continue
to believe the Salvadoran rebels resemble the contras in that both are mere superpower puppets.
The key to the Salvadoran rebels' success lies in the observation that they are a national and
nationalist movement, in tune with the social, economic and political conditions of their country.
In contrast, the Nicaraguan contras can in no way be characterized as a nationalist movement in
the above sense. Moreover, the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) is a political
force struggling for social change and political power on behalf of the majority of the Salvadoran
population. The contras represent only a tiny fraction of Nicaraguan society, and are opposed
to fundamental social change. Next, the FMLN does not require the assistance of a hemispheric
power to survive. The contras could not survive without US aid. Last but not least, FMLN leaders
are found INSIDE El Salvador, risking their lives and asserting leadership. Leaders of the UNO
(United Nicaraguan Opposition) and FDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Force) enjoy comfortable lives
in Miami, Tegucigalpa and Washington, DC. The NY TIMES reports that the search for answers has
led senior officials to conclude that the contras will be forced by the United States to leave Honduras
and establish themselves in Nicaragua. "The move is intended to force the rebels to act as guerrillas
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and stay in contact with the local populace." If the contras are obligated to cultivate support among
ordinary Nicaraguans, one of two scenarios is likely. The contras would be wiped out or they would
have to change their social and political message. If the latter is attempted, the contras may become
Sandinistas (!). The US media has also reported that the CIA will oversee contra training, military
and political strategy, and logistical support. This supervision, we are told, will occur in order to
"eliminate the circle of cronies and incompetent middlemen that have helped control the main
contra army." (NY TIMES, 12/15/86:6) In other words, the CIA wants to create an efficient, welloiled instrument that will answer to the United States. The problem with the CIA strategy is that
a tool of US foreign policy fails to deal with the most powerful social and political force in Latin
America: nationalism. In fact, in the face of such a neo-colonialist strategy even the FDN has found
cause to fight back. According to the TIMES, "Well aware that their powers are threatened, the
leaders of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force in Honduras and their civil associates have formed a
regional military council and a political party to consolidate their control." In the next few months,
prospects for a contra victory will deteriorate further, and infighting will escalate. Revolutionary
struggles are fought by revolutionaries on the battlefield and in the socio-political arena, based on
the logic, methods and philosophies of revolutionary movements. For the contras (or anyone else)
to pin their hopes for victory over the Sandinistas on borrowing the form of revolutionary struggles
without adopting revolutionary content is simply naive. This error is one that US policymakers and
those who serve them will eventually discover through their colossal failures. [Prof. Valdes teaches
sociology at the University of New Mexico, and is director of LADB.]

-- End --

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 2

